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Abstract 
This study presents a cost-benefit analysis of euro adoption for the case of 
Bulgaria. Based on a review of existing similar studies for other East European 
EU member states, it outlines the basic types of potential costs and benefits of 
euro  adoption,  and  applies  them  to  the  specific  Bulgarian  economic  and 
economic policy context. The most important relevant features of the Bulgarian 
economy with respect to the analysis are found to be the catching-up status of 
the country and the currency board arrangement. In this context the study 
finds that a net benefit of above 15 % of GDP in a 20 year horizon can be 
expected for Bulgaria due mainly to enhanced capital inflows and to a smaller 
extent to a boost in trade with the EU and to higher domestic saving in light of 
enhanced policy credibility. Along the way the study attempts to draw attention 
to  important  nuances  which may  be  of  relevance  for  the  analysis  of  euro 
adoption in Eastern Europe in general. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The adoption of the euro as the final act of joining the economic and monetary 
union is a process facing all countries which have joined the EU since the 
Maastricht treaty of 1992. Six of them (Austria and Finland from the fourth 
enlargement, and Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, and Slovakia from the fifth enlargement) 
have already completed this process. The underlying logic of the creation of the 
monetary union within the EU is that the benefits, especially in the long run, of 
such a development decisively outweigh the relevant costs not only for the union as 
a whole, but for individual participating countries as well. Empirical confirmation of 
this logic is still pending, as the history of the euro area unfolds, but the countries 
which are required by their treaty obligations to adopt the euro need to be able to 
assess specific areas of potential costs and risks, related to the change in monetary 
regime, so that they can devise policies for their management. 
 
Such an assessment is crucially dependent on specific country context and it is 
hard to draw general conclusions. The present study concentrates on the context of 
one particular country – Bulgaria – with the goal to reach and answer to the 
question about the relevant costs and benefits of euro adoption and about the 
adequacy of the respective government strategy. 
 
While doing this, the study will address a number of issues related to the topic of 
financial integration in the EU. More specifically, the case of Bulgaria can be useful 
in the acquisition of more contextual knowledge about the way the level of 
competition in the banking sector affects positively or negatively the economic 
processes in a small new member state, employing a peculiar monetary regime, on 
its way to the euro area. It is also useful in providing interesting insights about the 
role of foreign bank ownership, with the related nature of capital flows and 
currency structure of bank lending, in such a context. 
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2. Methodological approach to the case study: 
justification of the proposed structure of the paper 
 
The main task of this study is to identify the potential costs and benefits for 
Bulgaria from joining the euro area and adopting the euro as a national currency. 
The starting point for approaching this task is the observation that the experience 
of joining the euro area is not uniquely Bulgarian, yet at the same time it is, in 
every single case, a once-in-a-country’s-lifetime event.  
 
Given this observation, the chosen method for arriving at an estimate of the 
potential costs and benefits for Bulgaria from euro adoption is one of analytical 
narrative. It applies the existing literature and knowledge about the structure of the 
Bulgarian economy to arrive at informed and internally consistent yet lacking 
formal statistical rigor and testability answer to the research question. The rest of 
this methodological section presents the chosen method, and then explains its 
choice over more formal statistical methods. 
 
Due to the fact that the euro area itself exists for more than a decade, has been 
joined by a number of countries, and will be joined by more at some point in the 
future, there exists a body of relevant literature: on monetary unions and currency 
areas in general, on the euro area in particular, and even more specifically on the 
potential effects of EU countries which are to join the area in the future. 
 
This body of literature has identified and described to a considerable degree the 
space of effects (both costs and benefits) from joining the euro area. This is where 
the evaluation of this event for the case of Bulgaria will begin. A short review of 
existing studies, concentrating mostly on the ones devoted to the effects of the euro 
area, and especially on evaluating costs and benefits for countries which are about 
to join in the future, defines this space and uses it to evaluate the effects on 
Bulgaria. 
 
The space of potential effects of joining the euro has to be superimposed on the 
existing structure and peculiarities of the Bulgarian economy, as it is expected to 
evolve within the EU. Given the theoretical and empirical results reviewed in the 
literature, a complete and detailed description of the Bulgarian economy is not 
warranted. Rather, what is needed is the informed and limited by the insights from 
the literature description of those aspects of the Bulgarian economy, which are 
important in drawing conclusions about the potential effects of euro adoption. By 
far the most important and most highly relevant with respect to the euro specific 
feature of the Bulgarian economy is the combination of a currency board regime 
and structural budget surpluses, but other specific features relevant within the 
space of potential effects are also described and analyzed. 
 
Given the matrix of potential effects, and the analytical description of the specifics 
of the Bulgarian economy, a straight forward evaluation, mostly qualitative, but 
wherever possible also quantitative, of the costs and benefits from Bulgaria’s joining 
the euro area, is performed. 
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Finally, from the point of view of the already identified major relevant for Bulgaria 
costs (esp. risks) and benefits from joining the euro area, a general evaluation of the 
existing government strategy for the adoption of the euro is provided. 
 
Other methods for reaching estimates of the potential costs and benefits for 
Bulgaria from euro adoption are also possible. Mostly, they involve formal modeling 
of the economy and use of statistical techniques for estimation of coefficients and 
effects between alternative scenarios. In the case of euro adoption, especially for 
Bulgaria, however, these rigorous techniques suffer from a serious and 
insurmountable deficiency. All such models need to be estimated based on existing 
data observations. In the case of euro adoption it is easily demonstrable that any 
combination of a given model and data used for its estimation does not and cannot 
cover the domain relevant for making inference about the case of euro adoption. 
Even if under a cross-section approach it may be claimed that some countries 
which have already adopted the euro are indicative for countries which will adopt it 
in the future, the number of observations is very small. 
 
The use of formal models and statistical estimates runs the very serious risk of 
providing highly biased and highly uncertain estimates of coefficients and potential 
effects generated by models and data which are completely irrelevant for the 
realities which will actually happen in the countries which will adopt the euro in 
the future. Since neither the direction, nor the size of such biases, nor the degree of 
uncertainty or irrelevance of the estimates can be judged, formal statistical 
techniques cannot compensate in clarity and rigor what they inevitably in the case 
of euro adoption lose in terms of relevance and precision. 
 
Thus the proposed here analytical narrative approach, even though it is naturally 
subject to personal opinion and biases of the researcher, is more clear about its 
deficiencies, and provides a more consistent framework for addressing the concrete 
question at hand, namely whether Bulgaria will benefit or not from euro adoption, 
and if yes to what extent. 
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3. Existing studies of costs and benefits of adopting 
the euro from a national perspective 
 
The literature on optimal currency areas and their effects on the member 
economies is exceedingly rich, and it is far beyond the scope of this study to review 
it all. The theoretical basis is given by Mundell (1961), while there are several larger 
empirical studies, such as Rose (2000), Frankel and Rose (2002), and Rose and 
Stanley (2005). 
 
For the case of the euro area, possibly the most relevant discussion can be found in 
the proceedings of the June 2005 ECB conference on the effects of the EMU 
(http://www.ecb.eu/events/conferences/html/emu.en.html), where all the major 
dimensions of the space of effects from euro area membership are identified and 
discussed. 
 
More specifically targeting the effects of the euro on the new EU member states, the 
proceedings from a conference in Prague in 2004, published by the IMF in a volume 
edited by Schadler (2005) aim at identifying challenges and opportunities facing the 
countries in Eastern Europe with respect to the adoption of the euro. These 
proceedings step on the existing literature with the goal to outline the specifics of 
the eventual effects of euro adoption for this particular region of the EU. 
 
Finally, the results of the 2005 ECB conference on the EMU and of Schadler (2005) 
have served as the basis for a number of evaluations of the potential effects of euro 
adoption for individual new EU member states. What follows is a short overview of 
several such studies, performed with the goal to clarify the space, or matrix, of 
expected effects. 
 
It is probably appropriate to begin with the reports on the effects of the euro for an 
East European country which is already in the euro area, namely Slovakia. The 
broadest study is the National Bank of Slovakia report on euro adoption in Slovakia 
(NBS, 2006, ed. Martin Šuster; summarized very well in Šuster, BIATEC 2006, esp. 
the table on page 6), and it identifies a rich set of costs and benefits. It claims all 
firms and households will be affected, on net positively, by the adoption of the euro. 
Direct effects consist of elimination of transaction costs on currency exchange; 
elimination of exchange rate risk and increase in price transparency with related 
improvement in competition inside; lower interest rates and cost of capital. 
 
The report seems to consider the indirect effects as much wider: growth in foreign 
trade (estimated based on Rose and Stanley 2005) and growth in foreign direct 
investment. Since this is generally the case with other East European focused 
studies, presented below, an important point with respect to the trade effect of euro 
adoption needs to be made here. While the Rose (2000) and Rose and Stanley 
(2005) studies find very large effects of currency unions on trade, this does not 
seem to hold when the euro area is studied in more detail. Baldwin (2006) and 
Baldwin et.al. (2008), which are among the more comprehensive studies on the 
trade effect of the euro in the euro area and in the EU in general, find significant, 
but not very large trade effect which can be attributed to the adoption of the same 
currency itself, rather than to other integration processes. Their estimate is that the 
boost in trade is in the range around 5 %. In such a case, the long term trade effect 
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from euro adoption may be still significant, but smaller than in the estimates in the 
reports reviewed here. 
 
Continuing with the case of Slovakia, the major costs from euro adoption, identified 
in NBS 2006 are the changeover itself and the loss of some revenues for banks 
related to exchange transactions. The loss of independent monetary policy is dealt 
with carefully in the report, but is not considered to be large due to very limited 
effectiveness of monetary policy before euro adoption anyway –capital flows “several 
times exceed the possibility of monetary policy to influence them” (Šuster, BIATEC 
2006, p.4). 
 
Changeover itself may lead to a one-time more inflation, but also probably to faster 
price convergence to the euro area average than the country would have if not in 
euro area, and this may erode the rise in real purchasing power of savings and 
pensions – but especially with respect to pensions, higher nominal growth in the 
economy means no real threat to them. Then the report discusses the importance of 
free movement of labor in the euro area, and reforms leading to higher flexibility 
throughout the area. 
 
The other Slovakia study is prepared in the OECD framework (Hüfner and Koske, 
2006). They also mention the one-off changeover, and the minor but unevenly 
distributed cost of one-time price level increase. The authors argue that, after lower 
inflation in the beginning, in the long run Balassa-Samuelson will keep Slovak 
inflation rate above euro area average, but also that after minor effect on interest 
rates in the beginning, in the longer run Slovak interest rates will drop towards 
euro area levels leading to large benefits. According to them the risk for more 
volatile economy due to loss of own monetary policy requires enhancing competition 
and flexibility structural policies. 
 
Petr Gocev (2006) concentrates on two areas of change related to the eventual 
adoption of the euro in the Czech Republic: in inflation, and in the monetary policy 
regime. On inflation, starting from the observed serious difference between 
measured and perceived inflation in the wake of euro adoption, he points that euro 
area membership may cause higher inflation to poorer households, because it 
affects their basket more negatively especially if euro adoption coincides with a 
period of stagnating nominal wages, and may lead to temporary decline in their 
living standard. 
 
This issue is dealt with, theoretically and empirically, in a number of studies of the 
euro changeover in the countries which have already made the transition from 
national currencies to the euro – more comprehensive studies include Dzuida and 
Mastrobuoni (2009), and Ehrmann (2006). The theoretical reason for this one-time 
effect of euro changeover is the combination of complex conversion rates, which 
temporarily, but significantly decrease price transparency to consumers, and the 
large percentage effects of rounding up of relatively cheaper goods, esp. priced 
under 1 euro. Both papers find empirical confirmation of the theoretical insight, 
indicating that the relatively poorer households, which are prone to purchasing 
goods most vulnerable to such rounding price effects, may carry a disproportionate 
share of this, albeit one-time and relatively small, burden of euro adoption. While 
expecting such an effect is clearly realistic, it is very difficult to quantify it in both 
its parts – the cost of public perception of higher inflation due to the euro, 
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potentially damaging the acceptance and the confidence in the new currency itself, 
and the unequal distribution of the changeover burden. 
 
After discussing the one-time price effect, Gocev (2006) looks at the effects of the 
impossibility to realize an independent monetary policy which is important if the 
different countries have different phasing of the business cycle relative to the euro 
area. He suggests that the loss of own monetary policy if business cycles are not 
aligned will have negative effect. 
 
On Poland there are two materials of interest with respect to euro adoption. A 
speech by RybiJski (2007) outlines three traditional areas of interest in currency 
adoption: lower transaction costs, lower interest rates and trade creation. The costs 
are also identified: asymmetric shocks and arising micro- and macroeconomic 
imbalances. He points that in a monetary union the only tool for a country to react 
to asymmetric shocks is fiscal policy, and that in such conditions structurally 
flexibility is very important (specifically he mentions wage adjustments). 
 
The imbalances are related to lending booms, current account deficits and rising 
inflation pressures: all of them due to the fact that the real interest rates will drop, 
as a result of currency union, but for the small country will go below the “optimal” 
(as can be identified in the analytical framework of Wicksell (1898) and Woodford 
(2003)). 
 
The second material on Poland is a comprehensive National Bank of Poland report 
(NBP 2003, ed. Jakub Borowski). The authors start from the costs of euro adoption, 
esp. the loss of adjustment through independent interest rates and floating 
exchange rate. The claim is that the effectiveness of exchange rate depreciation is 
doubtful, while interest rate policy can be substituted by alternative shock-
absorption mechanisms such as labor market flexibility (mobility of labor and 
downward flexibility of wages), and by fiscal policy soundness over the cycle, 
especially by having unrestrained automatic stabilizers and limited discretionary 
interventions. The estimated costs of asymmetric shocks also depends on the 
probability of it happening, which depends on the degree of business cycle 
synchronization and (intra-industry) trade integration. A third cost is the temporary 
necessity to achieve low inflation to fulfill the inflation criterion. The benefits 
discussed in NBP 2003 are the elimination of exchange rate risk, lower transaction 
costs, rise in domestic investment due to capital inflow, decrease in macroeconomic 
risks due to enhanced credibility of macroeconomic policy, also fostering longer 
term capital inflow. According to the report, better access of Polish enterprises to 
financing will lead to better allocation of resources. 
 
The point in the NBP 2003 about decreased macroeconomic risks due to enhanced 
credibility of macroeconomic policies finds an interesting corroboration from a 
different angle in Beechey et. al. (2007), where it is reported that the euro area 
seems to be anchoring inflation expectations better than the United States. While 
this may be due more to the specific setup of monetary policy in the euro area with 
important features of inflation targeting embedded in the system, still for any East 
European country such credible and firm anchoring will be a significant change. 
 
Another point, made in the NBP 2003 report about potential improvements in 
efficiency of enterprises, also finds corroboration in related research on the euro 
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area. Ottaviano et. al. (2009) finds significant enterprise-level efficiency effects of 
euro adoption by studying various manufacturing sectors across the first 12 euro 
area countries in years near the initiation of the euro area. The authors find that 
the introduction of the euro increased competitiveness (defined as the efficient use 
of inputs) in general, and in particular in smaller euro area economies such as 
Austria, Belgium and Finland. 
 
A report evaluating the potential effects of euro adoption on Hungary is performed 
by the National Bank of Hungary (NBH 2002). This report explicitly discusses the 
issues of changes in seigniorage revenue and in the risk of financial contagion. The 
report estimates a significant overall net benefit through higher and more stable 
growth. It identifies three main benefits – lower transaction costs, expansion of 
foreign trade, lower interest rates. According to the authors, Hungary is expected to 
incur a seigniorage loss, which almost completely offsets the gain from lower 
transaction costs. However, given the rules for distributing seigniorage revenues in 
the euro area, it is to be expected that relatively poorer new member states will at 
least initially benefit in this respect from joining the euro area. 
 
The report also discusses the other indirect costs, beginning with asymmetric 
shocks and claiming that they are no more likely for Hungary than for other less 
developed members of the euro area. This is true for both the structure of gross 
value added, and for the trade integration, there is some asymmetry within some 
manufacturing industries, but is also not much different from other euro area 
countries. Here they also mention the importance of flexibility and competition, and 
of fiscal soundness, for decreasing the potential costs from asymmetric shocks. But 
as opposed to Poland, the Hungarian report claims that automatic stabilizers will 
be very limited, and discretionary measures will be more important. They also make 
the important point that independent monetary policy also entails risks – of 
financial contagion, including large capital flow swings, and of currency crises. 
 
As a last example of the burgeoning literature on the potential effects of euro 
adoption on new EU member states is the study of BitKns and KaužMns (2004) on 
Latvia. They split the impact in two groups. First, impact on the real sector, then 
impact on the financial sector.  
 
They claim that in general the biggest benefits are elimination of exchange rate risk 
and related drop in interest rates, and the boost in trade, while the biggest cost is 
the loss of ability to tailor monetary policy to the national business cycle, which in 
the worst case scenario will mean actually amplified macroeconomic fluctuations 
after entering the euro area. They also make the point that it is not the geography 
of trade flows, but the invoicing which is more relevant when assessing possible 
effects of pegging irreversibly. They estimate relatively very high positive long term 
effects of joining the euro area on trade and on growth in Latvia. Also on the real 
side, in trying to anticipate asymmetric shocks, they compare Latvia’s secotral (by 
GVA) structure with that of the euro area, but also with other converging euro area 
members (southern Europe). Then they concentrate of industrial structure, because 
it is most tradable, but conclude that ultimately this boils down to the 
geographical/currency structure of exports. Here they argue that dynamically, 
(almost) all EU members will join the euro, and in assessing long term asymmetric 
impact it is necessary to look at the share in exports of all these countries. 
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As all other authors, BitKns and KaužMns (2004) emphasize the importance of 
cyclical convergence and labor market flexibility, but they also add the relevance of 
monetary policy transmission, by performing a VAR and indicating that Latvia is 
less responsive to interest rate shock than the EU. They also devote more attention 
to the effects of euro adoption on the financial sector, esp. the role, structure, and 
incomes of banks. 
 
The brief overview of various studies, which have aimed at evaluating the potential 
effects of euro adoption on the economies in Eastern Europe is sufficient to outline 
a number of important dimensions, which can serve as the basis for a similar 
evaluation for the case of Bulgaria. Table 1 below presents in a concise way the 
potential areas of costs and benefits from adopting the euro, dividing them in two 
broad categories depending on whether they are expected to have level or growth 
effects over the economy. 
 
Table 1. Areas of costs and benefits from euro adoption for an East European 
country 
Level effects Growth effects
Costs - Changeover costs
- Loss of business to banks 
- (Possible) one-time upward 
shock on price level hurting 
the poor 
- Temporary loss of growth in order to 
fulfill inflation criterion 
- Medium-to-long-run higher inflation 
(catching up while pegged) 
- Loss of independent monetary policy 
Benefits - Reduction of transaction 
and administrative costs 
- Elimination of exchange 
rate risk and volatility 
- Reduced risk of financial 
contagion 
- Seigniorage gain 
- Gains from trade
- Gains from international capital flows: 
reduced cost of capital, increased 
capital inflows 
- Increased price transparency and 
degree of competition with permanent 
effect on allocative efficiency 
- Enhanced credibility of macroeconomic 
policy 
Source: derived from the text 
 
Table 1 outlines the basic matrix of potential, derived from the theoretical and 
empirical literature, effects of euro adoption in an EU member state. It will be 
applied to the specific Bulgarian context to arrive at an evaluation of the particular 
effects of euro adoption in the case of Bulgaria. With this goal in mind, the specific 
features of the Bulgarian context, especially the features relevant to the effects of 
euro adoption, are described below.  
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4. Description of the Bulgarian context 
 
Before the matrix of potential costs and benefits can be applied to Bulgaria, the 
basic indicators of the Bulgarian economy need to be described from the point of 
view of their relevance for the potential effects of euro adoption. In this respect, the 
indicators may be split in three groups: performance indicators, structural aspects, 
and institutional setup. 
 
This section overviews the performance, the structure and the institutional setup of 
the Bulgarian economy over the recent years. The dynamics and structure of 
Bulgarian foreign trade, and the related developments in the balance of payments 
can provide an idea about the potential trade effects and about the possibility and 
severity of asymmetric shocks after euro adoption. Also, the development and 
structure of the financial system can provide a relevant background for the 
evaluation of the changeover costs, the effects on banking business and on 
transaction costs, and the extent to which euro adoption will actually affect interest 
rates in the country. The institutional setup provides insights on the potential 
consequences from losing the present monetary policy setting, and on the potential 
enhancement of policy credibility. 
 
4.1. Bulgarian economy: performance indicators 
 
Table 2 below presents the dynamics of the basic internal macroeconomic 
indicators for the most recent decade. 
 
Table 2. Bulgaria, dynamic of major macroeconomic indicators, 1999-2008 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Real per capita 
GDP growth 
2.9 5.9 7.5 5.1 5.6 7.2 6.8 6.9 6.7 6.5
GDP deflator 3.7 6.7 6.7 4.4 1.8 5.2 3.8 8.5 7.8 10.3 
CPI inflation1 2.6 10.3 7.4 5.8 2.3 6.2 5.0 7.3 8.4 12.3
Unemployment 
rate1
13.8 18.2 18.1 17.7 14.3 12.7 11.5 9.6 7.7 6.3
Employment 
rate1
52.9 54.5 55.8 58.4 61.7 64.0
1Average annual values  
Source: National Statistics Institute 
 
Bulgaria is one the fastest growing economies among the EU-27 since the beginning 
of the 21st century. The growth rate of per capita real income for the decade 1998-
2008 is 6.1 percent per year, and has been remarkably stable, especially over the 
latter five years. The process of high growth has been accompanied by relatively 
high inflation as well. On average consumer prices have almost doubled over the 
period. 
 
For approximately the same period the dynamic of another major indicator, 
unemployment, has been also remarkably unidirectional. After peaking (according 
to the labor survey) at above 20 % in early 2000 due to the implementation of 
structural reforms in the sector of state owned enterprises, it registered an 
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uninterrupted drop until the latest available data for the last quarter of 2008, when 
it is below 6 %. As a mirror image of this development, the number of employed 
people has risen by more than 20 percent for the same period. In some regions, and 
for some professions, employers began reporting shortages of labor in 2007. 
 
A specific feature of the Bulgarian economy over the observed period is the sound 
budget balance, which has moved from small deficits at the end of the 20th century 
to surpluses after 2002. This has allowed the government do decrease its debt 
significantly and to become a major net creditor. 
 
The first decade of the 21st century is a period of growing external imbalances, 
which is demonstrated on Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Bulgarian external indicators, 1999-2008, in percent of GDP 
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Source: Bulgarian National Bank 
 
Exports have grown very rapidly in nominal terms, in real terms, and as a share of 
GDP, but imports have grown even more rapidly. Related to this development, the 
current account balance has expanded to internationally record levels.  
 
The other side of this process has been a very sharp increase of capital inflows 
through both the direct investment and credit channels. This has resulted in 
positive overall balance of payments throughout the period, and respective 
increases in the international reserves with the Bulgarian National Bank, which 
have grown from less than a quarter to more than one third of GDP. 
 
Finally, an especially important indicator in the context of analyzing the potential 
effects of euro adoption is the performance of the financial sector. As demonstrated 
in Table 3, starting from a very low base, the Bulgarian financial system has grown 
considerably.  
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Table 3. Bulgarian financial sector indicators, 2000 and 2008, in percent of GDP 
2000 2008
Banking system total assets 36.5 104.2 
Non-financial deposits 23.8 62.9
Domestic credit to non-
government 
11.7 71.4
Assets of non-bank financial 
intermediaries 
2.7 30.6
Market capitalization of the 
Bulgarian Stock Exchange 
4.8 18.3
Money supply 36.8 68.6
Source: Bulgarian National Bank, Financial Supervision Commission 
 
All in all, the financial sector has more than tripled relative to the economy over the 
reviewed period. This is closely related to the process of privatization and related 
inflow of foreign capital (see below on the structural aspects of the banking sector), 
as well as to the process of establishment, regulation, and development of various 
previously non-existent financial services. 
 
In summary, over the decade preceding the global financial and economic crisis of 
2008, the Bulgarian economy exhibits a dynamic typical for a catching-up country 
with relatively high nominal and real growth and deepening external imbalances. 
The real (income per capita) and nominal (price level) convergence of Bulgaria 
towards the EU-27 averages is demonstrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Bulgaria’s convergence, EU-27 = 100 
0
100
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
income per capita in PPP price level  
Source: Eurostat 
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It is obvious from Figure 2 that while the country is converging, this process has a 
very low start, and will most probably take a very long time. This means that for 
any reasonable analytical or policy time horizon, the performance of the country is 
likely to be dominated by the characteristic dynamics of convergence. 
 
It is important to mention that within the overarching context of convergence, the 
performance of the Bulgarian economy will be subject to significant shorter term 
fluctuations. In a clear reaction to the global financial and economic downturn in 
2008 almost all of these processes have reversed over the last months of 2008 and 
the first months of 2009. GDP growth has visibly slowed down, with a distinct 
possibility of becoming negative in 2009; inflation is dropping precipitously after 
recording very high levels between mid-2007 and mid-2008; the number of 
registered unemployed is showing signs of increasing for the first time in more than 
6 years; budget revenues are dropping; foreign trade turnover is decreasing fast, 
with imports dropping faster than exports and the current account deficit 
decreasing; capital inflows are decreasing even faster, and the overall balance of 
payments is turning negative; the money supply is contracting, albeit slowly, and 
bank credit is virtually stagnating. 
 
An important aspect of the performance of the Bulgarian economy, especially 
relevant for judging the effects of euro adoption, is the nominal convergence, 
especially with respect to business cycle and interest rates, to the Euro Area. The 
second of these indicators is shown on Figure 3, where the overnight interbank 
interest rates in Bulgaria and in the Euro Area are compared. Given the specific 
Bulgarian monetary regime (currency board), there is a very strong degree of 
convergence, which was evidently seriously disrupted by the global financial and 
later economic crisis beginning in the summer of 2007. By the end of 2009 the 
convergence of the two indicators has returned. 
 
Figure 3. Bulgarian (LEONIA) vs Euro Area (EONIA) overnight interest rates 
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Source: Bulgarian National Bank and http://www.euribor.org/html/content/eonia_data.html
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With respect to business cycle convergence, the present state of business cycle 
analysis in both the Euro Area, where only three cycles have been recorded1, while 
the Bulgarian economy in its present structure (EU integration under currency 
board) has not yet completed even one full cycle and lacks official dating. This 
makes a forma analysis of business cycles synchronization between Bulgaria and 
the Euro Area impossible at this moment. 
 
4.2. Bulgarian economy: structural aspects 
 
The performance of the Bulgarian economy reflects its underlying structure. In 
terms of the growth process, it is structured mostly around a sharp increase in the 
share of investment (gross fixed capital formation) in GDP, which has grown from 
less than 11 % in 1997 to more than 33 % in 2008. This investment boom has been 
driven mainly by the increased capital inflows, with the national savings rate 
remaining relatively stable at relatively low (about 15 %) levels. Major portions of 
the external trade developments have also been related to this process, with the 
share of investment goods almost doubling in the quickly growing Bulgarian 
imports over 1997-2008. On the other side, exports have also contributed 
considerably to the growth of the Bulgarian economy. The shares of household and 
government consumption have remained relatively stable, with these two 
components growing approximately with the speed of the overall economy. 
 
The structure of the country’s gross value added (GVA) by sector has also changed 
considerably over the analyzed period. This is illustrated in Figure 4, which 
compares 2008 with 1998. 
 
Figure 4. Share (in %) in GVA in Bulgaria by sector, 1998 and 2008. 
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Source: National Statistical Institute 
 
1 This work is performed by the CEPR Euro Area business cycle dating committee: 
http://www.cepr.org/data/Dating/
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Figure 4 captures the latest period in a process of transition of the structure of the 
Bulgarian economy from socialist (with remaining high share of agriculture, 
emphasis on industry and neglect of services), to a structure more comparable to 
modern developed economies dominated by services. In particular, the drop in the 
shares of agriculture and industry has been taken to some extent by construction, 
but mostly by services 1 (domestic trade, repairs, hotels and restaurants, transport, 
storage and communication), to a lesser extent by services 2, reflecting the 
financial, real estate and business sector, and least by services 3, reflecting mostly 
the public and social sector. 
 
As of 2008 the sectoral structure of GVA in Bulgaria is not dramatically different 
from the one in other EU countries, including countries already in the euro 
area(Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Gross Value Added structure, Bulgaria vs. others in EU, 2008 
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If, as in Fagan and Gaspar (2007 and 2008) the countries in the EU are split into 
more developed and converging, with the structure of the EU and the euro area as a 
whole being dominated by the developed large countries, then it can be seen in 
Figure 5 that Bulgaria’s GVA structure, with the exception of agriculture, is not 
more different from the “core” than are some countries which are already in the 
euro area, such as the Southern European Portugal and Greece, and the ex-
socialist Slovakia. 
 
A similar observation can be made if the focus is changed to the more disaggregated 
level of structure of the manufacturing industry, shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Structure of manufacturing industry, Bulgaria vs. others in EU, 2006 
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Again, with the exception of transport equipment, basic metals, and coke and 
refined petroleum, the structure of industry in Bulgaria is not dramatically different 
either from the “core” European countries, or from other converging countries in 
the euro area of similar size. This means that when the economic environment and 
business climate change with their natural cycle, the economic policy needs of 
Bulgaria will not be dramatically different from these countries, at least from the 
point of view of industry. 
 
A third observation of this type is the structure of Bulgarian trade with the EU. 
Bulgaria is consistently running deficits with the EU, and this is true for all four of 
the broad foreign trade categories (consumer goods, raw materials, investment 
goods, and energy products). For the case of Bulgaria, however, a specific feature is 
that the overall deficit is dominated by the deficit in investment goods – for the 
other three groups the deficit constitutes less than 5 % of total turnover in the 
respective group. This is largely related to the fact that Bulgaria is catching up, has 
a fast growing investment, which is to a very high degree financed by foreign capital 
inflows originating predominantly from the EU. 
 
As a broad measure of the structure of trade between Bulgaria and the rest of the 
EU, the Gruber-Lloyd index (introduced in Gruber and Lloyd, 1975) can be used. 
Its basic intuition is to receive a measure of the “symmetry” of trade between two 
partners by looking at the ratio of trade balance to total turnover for specific goods 
groups, and then to sum these ratios over all groups weighing them by their share 
in total turnover. The index is constructed so that 0 means very asymmetric trade, 
and 1 means completely symmetric trade in all goods groups. Applied at the level of 
10 basic goods groups under the SITC, rev. 3, classification, this index for the trade 
between Bulgaria and the EU countries in 2008 is 0.71 and can be interpreted as a 
relatively high level of symmetry.2
2 This value has been relatively stable for the 2000-2008 period, fluctuating between 0.66 
and 0.71. 
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Finally, a look at the financial structure of the Bulgarian economy is relevant for 
the analysis of potential effects of euro adoption. The financial sector in Bulgaria is 
relatively new, emerging from an almost complete meltdown during a crisis in 1996-
1997 which wiped out more than a third of the Bulgarian banks and brought most 
of the rest on the verge of bankruptcy. Since then the sector was privatized, and 
financial deepening took place, yet as of 2008 it is still at a level much lower than 
the one characteristic for the EU countries, especially for the EU-15. 
 
At present, the financial sector in Bulgaria is dominated by commercial banks. As 
of the end of 2008, banking system assets are larger than GDP and comprise 
approximately 80 % of total assets of all financial intermediaries in the country. 
There are 30 banking institutions – separate banks and branches of foreign banks – 
operating in the country. Of them 2, with a 3 % share in total assets, have 
government ownership (one is owned by the state, another has municipal 
participation). The rest are mostly foreign owned – publicly or privately owned by 
Bulgarians banks comprise about 16 % of total assets. Banks owned by non-EU 
owners, or their branches, comprise less than 3 % of total assets, with EU-owned 
local affiliates or branches dominating with a share of more than 81 %. 
 
The level of rivalry and competition in the banking sector in Bulgaria is high. In 
total assets, credits, and deposits the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is between 0.08 
and 0.086, which means that in all important aspects the banking sector in 
Bulgaria can be qualified as a highly contested and competitive market. 
 
At the same time, the non-bank financial sector in the country is not very 
developed. Leasing companies, other lenders, investment funds, insurance 
companies and pension funds hold about 20 % of total assets, but it needs to be 
recognized that more than a third of them are held by leasing companies, which are 
mostly owned by banks. 
 
Thus the financial sector in Bulgaria can be qualified as relatively small in 
international comparison, but visibly deepening, dominated by commercial banks, 
with the banking industry being owned mostly by EU organizations and 
characterized by relatively high level of competition. 
 
4.3. Bulgarian economy: macro-institutional setup 
 
The general institutional framework of the Bulgarian economy is defined by its 
membership in the European Union and the related adoption of the body of law 
known as acquis communautaire. Its aspects most pertinent to the issue of the 
effects of euro adoption are the four freedoms, promotion of competition, and 
economic and monetary union. 
 
The body of law of the EU imposes freedom of movement of goods, services, labor 
and capital so that no member country can impose unilateral restrictions in any of 
these areas with respect to other member countries. These freedoms in the areas of 
goods and capital movement seem to have been achieved in full, there are some 
purely temporary restrictions in freedom of movement of labor for new member 
states, and the freedom of movement of services in reality exists only partially, but 
importantly does hold for movement of financial services. The promotion of 
competition rules of the EU prevent member states from providing state aid to firms 
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and from limiting the access of EU firms to their domestic markets, including in 
matters of national public procurement. The economic and monetary union 
regulations, especially through the excessive deficit procedure, limits member 
states in their ability to follow expansionary fiscal policy through large (more than 3 
% of GDP) budget deficits, and aim at preventing pro-cyclical policies, thus 
significantly decreasing the available options for discretionary economic policies. 
 
The EU framework leaves the choice of monetary regime to the member states, 
provided some requirements for the level of independence of the monetary authority 
and for banking capital adequacy and supervision are followed. This is where the 
main differentiating feature of the Bulgarian monetary environment is to be found. 
Bulgaria has chosen to operate a currency board regime, which has been in place 
since mid-1997.  
 
Under such a regime the central bank is limited in its monetary policy discretion 
only to reserve requirements, and cannot purchase government paper or lend to 
domestic banks, thus having no discretion over the monetary base. This is achieved 
through a highly institutionalized (defined by an act of Parliament) fixed peg of the 
currency to the euro at EUR 1 = BGN 1.95583, and through a legislative obligation 
for the central bank to buy and sell unlimited quantities at this rate. Thus the 
monetary base is entirely a one-to-one function of the net capital flow to and from 
Bulgaria, and the limited influence of reserve requirements on the money multiplier 
is the only instrument the central bank has to affect the monetary environment. 
 
In effect the currency board regime means that Bulgaria fully imports the monetary 
policy of the European Central Bank, and the Bulgarian National Bank has a very 
limited capacity to take action to balance the developments in the euro area when 
they overflow into Bulgaria. Through the fixed exchange rate the currency board 
regime thus makes the catching-up process of Bulgaria easily visible in the already 
mentioned performance indicators – high economic growth, high capital inflows, 
high money supply growth, respectively relatively high inflation and appreciating 
real exchange rate. 
 
Institutionally, besides affecting monetary policy the execution of a currency board 
regime imposes specific boundaries on fiscal policy as well. Due to the fact that the 
central bank is forbidden by law to hold government debt paper and that monetary 
policy cannot accommodate fiscal deficits, if currency board countries want to 
maintain a sustainable overall economic policy mix they have to preserve an overall 
balance of the budget, or to record surpluses. 
 
The last pertinent to the potential effects of euro adoption institutional feature of 
the Bulgarian economy, which is reviewed here, is the flexibility of the labor market. 
This issue is discussed in Tzanov, 2007, where the conclusion is that the overall 
level of flexibility of the Bulgarian labor market is moderate with relatively high 
intersectoral mobility but limited institutionalization of flexible forms of 
employment. The most important aspect of labor market flexibility with respect to 
the issue of euro adoption is wage flexibility, especially downward flexibility, 
because all adjustments to negative external shocks under the fixed exchange rate 
have to happen through downward price changes. Downward price and especially 
wage rigidity means decreased ability to adjust, longer adjustment periods with 
depressed economic activity, and ultimately higher cost of negative shocks. At 
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present the collective bargaining in Bulgaria exists, with the Bulgarian employers’ 
bargaining position estimated as relatively stronger than the position of trade 
unions, with the time horizon of collective labor agreements relatively short, 
indicating that potentially the Bulgarian labor market is flexible, especially in 
comparison with the EU and the euro area, in this very important dimension. 
 
The general conclusion, which can be drawn after the focused look at the specific 
national context presented in this section, is that Bulgaria is a catching-up 
economy, closely tied to the EU and the euro area, experiencing related to the 
process external imbalances. Its financial intermediation, starting from very low 
levels, is still relatively low, but growing very fast, and highly internally competitive. 
The structure of production is not dramatically different from that in other 
countries already in the euro area, and its trade with the EU-27 is relatively 
symmetric. In terms of the potency of economic policies, Bulgaria is bound by the 
requirements of EU membership, and by its choice of a currency board as a 
monetary regime. It also has a labor market, which is potentially flexible in 
comparison with the EU and the euro area. In light of the outline in Table 1, these 
features of the Bulgarian economy help shape the evaluation of costs and benefits 
for the country from euro adoption, which is performed in the following section. 
 
Page 21 of 34 
5. Expected costs and benefits from euro adoption for 
Bulgaria 
 
The matrix of expected costs and benefits from euro adoption, extracted from the 
analysis of the existing literature on currency areas, European monetary 
integration, and on new member states, can be applied to the relevant aspects of 
the Bulgarian economy to obtain an idea about the potential effects for the case of 
Bulgaria. This is performed here in the order of presenting the various expected 
costs and benefits in Table 1. 
 
5.1. Expected costs of euro adoption for Bulgaria 
 
The first cost of euro adoption is the cost of monetary changeover. In Bulgaria such 
a changeover has been already performed in the recent past, with the 
redenomination of the Bulgarian lev in July 1999. Three major types of costs were 
incurred: printing and minting of new notes and coins with the related substitution 
logistics; changing in accounting and banking software; the legal costs of 
reregistering all companies with their redenominated capital, which was made 
unnecessarily expensive by the legislators by requiring all companies to go through 
the full court procedure of changing their registered capital rather than doing it ex 
officio. Even with this additional cost, which is easily avoidable in the changeover to 
the euro, and assuming that the banking and accounting costs are similar to the 
legal ones, the total cost amounted to approximately 0.15 % of the 1999 GDP. Even 
if the printing and minting costs have increased considerably due to quality 
requirements, given the existing experience with changeover and the probability of 
better legislative regulation of the process, it is most probable that the one-time 
changeover cost for Bulgaria will be between 0.2 and 0.3 % of GDP. 
 
NBS 2006, p.32-33 makes the point that while having an overall beneficial effect on 
transactions, euro adoption may mean some loss of business revenues for banks 
from operations related to foreign exchange, supporting the claim with the evidence 
that the share of net revenue from foreign currency operations in total profit for 
Slovakian banks has fallen by some 8 percentage points. For Bulgarian banks, a 
rough estimate of this type of business can be given by the net result from foreign 
currency trade, which comprises about 8 % of pre-tax banking sector profit for 
2008. If some fees and commissions are added to this estimate, and the fact that 
most of this business is in euro, then it is realistic to assume that banks may lose 
about 6 % of their profits due to loss of business, but that this will be to some 
extent indirectly compensated by the improved balances of their clients. If this 
indirect effect is ignored, the upper bound of the estimated cost is about 0.2 % of 
GDP. 
 
The third expected cost from euro adoption affecting the level of economic activity is 
the probability of having a one-time rise in the price level due to rounding and to 
opportunistic behavior by sellers in the months immediately following the 
introduction of the euro. This issue has focused public interest and perceptions in 
every country where the euro has been introduced. Given such sensitive public 
perceptions, governments will feel obliged to address them and to spend resources 
for both managing the perceptions, and compensating the poor who are among the 
threatened groups due to the fact that they are more prone to buying lower price 
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goods at smaller quantities where rounding effects may be more significant. Given 
the existing experience with inflation acceleration episodes in Bulgaria, when no 
specific government expenditures and programs were necessary, this cost can be 
expected to be negligibly small, ranging between 0 and 0.1 % of GDP. 
 
Going to the costs from euro adoption in terms of growth, the first one to consider 
is the temporary slowdown which may turn out to be necessary for compliance with 
the inflation criterion for membership in the euro area. This is even more of a 
problem for a currency board country, which cannot cool inflationary pressures 
with an appreciating nominal exchange rate. It is highly probable that for a 
catching-up member state with very low starting relative price level, inflation is 
naturally several percentage points higher than in the euro area, and it will have to 
disinflate to achieve the inflation criterion as it exists at present. If the necessary 
disinflation amounts to several percentage points, and if it has to happen through 
fiscal surpluses due to the limited monetary policy, this will mean higher taxation 
and a slowing down of economic activity. The relevant elasticity of economic activity 
with respect to disinflation is not known, but a look at previous disinflationary 
episodes (e.g. 2001-2002 by more than 10 percentage points, and 2006-2007q1 by 
more than 4 points) shows that economic growth has slowed very modestly if at all 
indicating a possibly low sacrifice ratio for Bulgaria. Thus if the country has to 
disinflate by 2 to 3 percentage points for one to two years, this will mean a loss of 
possibly less than 1 percentage point of GDP growth for about 2 years. 
 
An important qualification needs to be made here, distinguishing between countries 
which use a fixed exchange rate monetary regime and countries which use inflation 
targeting and have nominal exchange rate flexibility in the run-up to the euro area. 
On the one side, all these countries are catching up, have structurally higher 
inflation than the “core” euro area members, and given the stringent inflation 
criterion will have to pay a temporary disinflationary cost for joining the euro area. 
On the other side, depending on the chosen monetary regime the timing of paying 
this cost will probably be different for the two types of East European EU members. 
While, as pointed in the previous paragraph, exchange rate fixers may have real 
problems to disinflate in the last several years before adopting the euro, inflation 
targeters may have real problems in the several years after euro adoption. This may 
happen if they have used nominal appreciation as a disinflationary tool and find 
themselves ultimately and irreversibly pegged at a real exchange rate, which is too 
high and damages the competitiveness of their firms. The second scenario is 
irrelevant for Bulgaria as a currency board country, but will have to be considered 
by the four countries with inflation targeting. 
 
The last two of the expected costs from euro adoption listed in Table 1 do not seem 
to be highly relevant for the case of Bulgaria. The medium-to-long term higher 
inflation due to the catching-up process combined with no exchange rate flexibility 
is not an issue due to the fact that Bulgaria has a fixed exchange rate regime 
anyway, so that the higher inflation due to the catching up (demonstrated in Figure 
2 above) is happening and will continue to happen regardless of whether the 
country is in the euro area or not. 
 
The last cost, the risks related to the loss of independent monetary policy, deserves 
some special attention. The discussion of this potential cost related to long term 
inability of a country to smooth economic fluctuations through monetary policy 
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tailored for its specific dynamics and features is dominated by the assumption that 
the two possible counterfactuals are membership in a currency union and 
independent monetary policy. 
 
Under this assumption, new entrants into the euro area may experience a boom-
bust cycle led by credit dynamics, which in turn are caused by euro area monetary 
policy. In general, increased capital inflows (see below), continuing financial 
deepening from a relatively low base, coupled with monetary policy maintaining 
interest rates which are lower than the optimal for the given country mean an 
unavoidable credit boom, and also inevitable compounding of risks, eventually 
becoming unsustainable and leading to a financial bust. Analyzing this particular 
possibility for the case of Poland, Eichengreen and Steiner (2008) arrive at the 
conclusion that such a development is a definite possibility for Poland. At the same 
time, they identify some factors which may weaken this effect. These include some 
convergence in interest rates before euro adoption, rigorous prudential supervision 
on banks, and labor market flexibility. 
 
The assumption that the relevant dichotomy is “currency union or independent 
monetary policy”, which is crucial for the importance of euro adoption for the 
emergence of a boom-bust cycle, is however highly unrealistic in the case of the 
new member states of the EU, which acceded in the first decade of the 21st century. 
 
All of these countries are very small relative to the euro area. The biggest economy 
in the region (Poland) has less than 4 % of euro area GDP, and all 8 countries from 
Eastern Europe which are not already in the euro area have a total GDP less than 
10 % of the euro area for 2008. As members of the union they are subject to its 
institutional framework and cannot block trade flows, but even more importantly 
cannot prevent capital flows and financial services. For this reason foreign trade of 
all these countries is dominated by the EU, while at the same time they have no 
power to influence the size or, very importantly, the currency denomination of the 
capital flows and of the domestic credit. As a result the role of the euro in these 
countries’ financial sectors is very important, and the central banks do not have a 
significant control over the domestic monetary environment, because they have no 
power over the currency in which a major portion of financial transactions take 
place. To talk of true independent monetary policy for any of these countries would 
be highly unrealistic. Thus the counterfactual to euro area membership is a 
situation of very limited monetary policy independence with a very high level of 
dependence on the monetary conditions in the euro area. A similar point is also 
made by Baldwin (2006). 
 
In such a setting, discussions about structural symmetries and cyclical 
synchronizations are unimportant. Whether an East European member state has a 
symmetric economic structure and trade with the EU and highly synchronized 
business cycle with the euro area or not, it makes a very little difference between 
the scenarios of membership in the euro area versus the relevant counterfactual. 
This is probably why the estimate of the cost related to the loss of independent 
monetary policy for the case of Slovakia, provided in the Table on p. 6 in Šuster 
2006, is a negligible 0.04 % of GDP growth. 
 
This argument of the insignificance of the issue of losing an independent monetary 
policy in the case of euro area accession is even more pertinent in the case of 
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Bulgaria. The currency board arrangement is in effect a voluntary abandoning of 
independent monetary policy by the country. And as the only existing episode of 
attempted active intervention of the BNB to curb credit growth through tightening 
reserve requirements demonstrates (Vassilev and Dimitrova, forthcoming), the 
effectiveness of this sole remaining monetary policy instrument is very limited with 
the only effect of the measures being not to curb credit growth, but to take it off the 
balance sheets of banks. A major reason for this has been the combination of a 
highly contested market for banking services in Bulgaria with a predominant 
foreign, especially EU, ownership of different banks. The first means that banks 
cannot allow themselves to lose market share, even if some costs for complying with 
the new requirements are necessary. The second means they have a significant 
access to financing from outside and reserve requirements, or any other monetary 
policy instruments for that matter, are a relatively minor constraint.  
 
In light of this finding, it can even be argued that once Bulgaria enters the euro 
area, meaning that BNB will be allowed to perform open market operations and to 
lend to banks, through its vote in the monetary policy setting body it will actually 
have more influence over the Bulgarian monetary environment than it has at 
present. In fact this argument may be extended to all East European EU member 
states: if they all enter the euro area and suffer from a similar boom-bust threat, 
they can form a voting block within the monetary policy setting body (ECB), which 
will be able to at least partially influence the overall euro area monetary conditions 
so that the boom-bust is milder. 
 
The standard argument on the importance of independent monetary policy may run 
that a euro area country may suffer more adjustment costs as an euro area 
member than as having its own monetary policy if it is “surrounded” by non-euro 
countries able to depreciate. For Bulgaria such countries would be Macedonia, 
Serbia and especially Turkey – the relative size of trade with these countries is 
significant, and for Turkey size allows for relatively more independent Turkish 
monetary policy. While in general this is a very interesting consideration, the 
currency board and the fixed exchange rate in Bulgaria mean that the difference 
between euro area membership and preserving the present regime is insignificant 
in this respect. 
 
The overall conclusion of this discussion is that by entering the euro area Bulgaria 
cannot suffer a cost due to loss of independent monetary policy because there is no 
independent monetary policy to lose. Then the expected costs from euro adoption 
for Bulgaria boils down to a less than 0.5 % of GDP level effects and possibly 
several years with about 1 percentage points lower growth due to the need to 
comply with the inflation criterion. 
 
5.2. Expected benefits from euro adoption for Bulgaria 
 
Going to the side of the expected benefits, again the benefits affecting levels will be 
considered first, and then the benefits with respect to growth rates. 
 
The first benefit will be lower transaction and administrative costs for the Bulgarian 
economic agents, who now have to pay for currency exchange services. Managing 
exchange rate risk is less of an issue given the fixed exchange rate. The overall 
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transaction cost benefit is expected to exceed the loss of similar business revenues 
to banks, discussed above, giving an estimate of about 0.2 % of GDP. 
 
While in the case of Bulgaria the elimination of exchange rate risks and volatility in 
terms of level effects should be negligible, an important point about the indirect 
effect of such a change needs to be made. At present the exchange rate risk exists 
only as a potential threat, without requiring much current management. Politically, 
it is conceivable that at some point in the future the currency board regime may be 
abandoned and floating exchange rate introduced, and this potential development 
needs to be taken into consideration when longer term projects and decisions are 
considered. Sometimes this potentiality is used as an explanation of observed 
differences between Bulgaria and the other members of the euro area. Euro area 
membership will eliminate such an explanation, and if after joining the monetary 
union such differences persist, it will be obvious that they are a result not of 
exchange rate risk, but of other risks in the economy. This is likely to increase the 
political pressure to address them, because it will be politically impossible to hide 
behind the exchange rate risk. Due to the fact that in the case of Bulgaria euro 
adoption will eliminate only a potential eventuality of exchange rate risk, the benefit 
is relatively small, between 0 and 0.1 % of GDP. 
 
Another benefit from joining the euro area is the drop in the susceptibility of a 
smaller country to financial contagion. While this benefit is easy to accept as a 
potentiality, it is very difficult to estimate quantitatively, because no reasonable 
estimates can be made of either the costs of contagion, or the change in 
probabilities of contagion after euro adoption. This is all the more difficult after the 
events of the present global financial turmoil when the euro area is also clearly 
affected and has proven susceptible. 
 
The last level benefit from euro adoption for Bulgaria, mentioned in Table 1 is 
seigniorage gain. At present the net interest income of the BNB is about 0.6 % of 
GDP, and Gros, 2004 estimates that under the rules of distributing seigniorage 
revenues in the euro area, which tend to favor poorer countries by giving some 
weight to population as well as to GDP, Bulgaria may gain another 0.7 to 0.8 % of 
GDP in its first year of adopting the euro. Gains are expected to last at least until 
its income level significantly converges towards the euro area levels, and the 
present value of this gain may reach at least several percentage points of GDP. 
 
Even though the level benefits from euro adoption in the case of Bulgaria already 
outweigh the rough estimate of the expected costs, in reality the expectation is that 
the growth benefits from euro adoption will be significantly larger, although more 
difficult to estimate quantitatively. 
 
The first growth effect is related to the trade creation for a country after its 
accession into a monetary union. While estimates of the currency union impact on 
mutual trade between its members vary by an order of magnitude (RybiJski, 2007), 
and estimates of this trade growth on real income growth are equally broad ranging, 
the estimated effects for different East European countries are very large, with long 
term effects on real GDP in the range of 5-20 %. These estimates, however, are 
likely dependent on the methodology in Rose, 2000, which has been criticized. For 
example, Baldwin et.al. (2008), stepping on other studies as well, find the trade 
effect for the case of the euro area to be in the range of 5 % boost to trade. In such 
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a case, the longer term effect may still be significant, but not as large – potentially 
in the range of several percentage points higher GDP in a horizon of several 
decades.  
 
However, Baldwin et. al. (2008) makes another important and relevant for the 
Bulgarian context point. As can be seen in Table 2 and Figure 2, Bulgaria has been 
very attractive for FDI, which has been greater than 10 % of GDP for the 2004-
2008, yet this has had a very moderate effect on growth, if any. The standard 
explanation for such a development is that this investment has gone not so much 
into export-boosting capacity, but rather in less export-productive spheres such as 
services and especially construction and real estate. Yet Baldwin et. al. (2008) find 
that euro adoption has a very strong FDI effect precisely in the manufacturing 
sector, which has a very strong export potential. In the Bulgarian context this 
finding would mean that the trade effect through increased FDI in manufacturing 
will be relatively large for Bulgaria. For this reason, accepting the lower trade effect 
estimates of Baldwin et. al. (2008), but also recognizing the potential FDI effect on 
future export growth for Bulgaria, a reasonable estimate in a 20 year horizon may 
be a boost to GDP by about 5 %. 
 
The second growth effect is related to the fact that monetary union membership 
increases capital flows. In the case of a small, catching-up country this means a 
considerable period of large net capital inflows due to elimination of risks of balance 
of payments crises. The increased net capital inflow reduces the cost of capital in 
the country and contributes to growth in investment and, with a lag, to increased 
export competitiveness. These effects are highly dependent on the specific country 
context, and for this reason rigorous estimates are difficult to produce. However, 
recently Bulgaria has experienced a wave of increased capital inflow related to the 
country joining NATO and the EU. With the sharp rise in foreign direct investment 
and in foreign lending to Bulgarian banks and firms, interest rates on short-term 
and long-term loans to firms and households decreased by 2 to 3 percentage 
points, and real GDP growth increased by about 2 percentage points on average. 
Even if the effect of joining the euro area is smaller, and the effect of the increased 
capital inflow on interest rates decreases with time, the cumulative effect of 
increased growth over a period of several decades, at least while the catching-up 
process lasts, will be measured by tens of percentage points of GDP. For the sake of 
arriving at a number for this potential benefit for the case of Bulgaria, 10 % of GDP 
can be taken as a lower bound of the interest rate effect over a 20 year horizon. 
 
The observation that euro area membership increases monetary policy credibility 
thus decreasing various hedging costs and interest rates and profitability, only 
enhances the point made in the previous paragraph. It may also have a beneficial 
effect on the overall domestic saving rate with the ensuing long-term positive effects 
on growth. Such an effect may range between 0 and another 5 % to GDP in a 20 
year horizon. 
 
Finally, entering a monetary union will increase the transparency of prices. 
Consumers will be able to compare more easily relative prices in the context of a 
very large economic area, and will respectively apply some pressure to producers 
and suppliers to improve efficiency in order to provide competitive pricing. In the 
long run this will lead to efficiency and allocative gains with an additional positive 
growth effect. It is impossible to arrive at a quantitative estimate of this effect, but it 
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has the potential to be large for the case of Bulgaria, which is a relatively small 
country where internal competitive forces are relatively weak. 
 
The overall estimate of the net benefit of euro adoption for Bulgaria in a 20 year 
horizon is summarized in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Summary of costs and benefits of euro adoption for Bulgaria in 20 year 
horizon 
Costs: % of GDP in 20 years
Changeover costs -0.2 to -0.3  
Loss of business to banks -0.2
One-time upward shock on price level hurting the poor 0.0 to -0.1
Total level costs -0.4 to -0.6
Temporary loss of growth to fulfill inflation criterion -2.0
Medium-to-long-run higher inflation -
Loss of independent monetary policy -
Total growth costs -2.0
Total costs -2.4 to -2.6
Benefits  
Reduction of transaction and administrative costs +0.2
Elimination of exchange rate risk and volatility +0.0 to +0.1
Reduced risk of financial contagion ? +
Seigniorage gain +3.0 to +5.0
Total level benefits +3.2 to +5.3
Gains from trade +5.0
Gains from capital flows    +10.0
Price transparency, competition, allocative efficiency ? + (potentially large)
Enhanced credibility of monetary policy 0.0 to +5.0
Total growth benefits +15.0 to +20.0
Total benefits +18.2 to +25.3
Total net benefit at a 20 year horizon +15.6 to +22.9
Source: derived from the text 
 
In conclusion, the rough estimates of level benefits from euro adoption for Bulgaria 
are enough to offset the total of expected costs. The major benefits, which are 
expected to result in higher growth rate of the Bulgarian economy over a 
considerable time period, are difficult to estimate, but a realistic gauge would put 
them in the range of above 10 percentage points of GDP in a 20 year horizon. 
 
This rough estimate can be compared to other similar estimates for East European 
EU member states, the studies of which have already been discussed above. Table 5 
presents such a comparison, using the adopted 20 year horizon, to which the level 
and growth effects are extrapolated. It is important to mention that these estimates 
should be viewed as close to the lower bound of the potential net benefit, because 
most of the costs have been accounted for, while important potential benefits, 
especially the ones related to the indirect effect on competition and efficiency, have 
not been quantified. 
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Table 5. Estimates of net benefit of euro adoption for East European countries. 
Country (ordered by year of estimate) Net benefit of euro adoption as % of GDP in 
20 years 
Hungary (2002) +13.4 to +19.3
Poland (2004) +4.0 to +10.2
Latvia (2004) Up to +19.0 
Slovakia (2006) +7.6 to +21.4
Bulgaria +15.6 to +22.9
Source: derived from text; respective country references 
 
The comparison in Table 5 indicates that the lower bound of the estimate for 
Bulgaria is largest, and its upper bound, while still the largest, is not dramatically 
different from other estimates. In light of the discussion above, two main reasons 
for the relatively greater estimated net benefit for Bulgaria can be highlighted. First 
is the fact that it starts its catching-up from the lowest base, so that the trade and 
especially capital effects should be naturally larger. Second is the fact that, having 
a currency board regime as the alternative to membership in the euro area, 
Bulgaria has no independence of its monetary policy to lose by euro adoption and 
will consequently not incur any additional costs in this respect. 
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6. Review of the Bulgarian government strategy for 
euro adoption 
 
The Bulgarian government, represented on the issue of euro adoption by the 
Council of Ministers and by the Bulgarian National Bank, has clearly indicated that 
it considers the potential benefits from membership in the euro area as significantly 
outweighing the costs in the case of Bulgaria. For this reason a strategic agreement 
was signed between them in 2004 (BNB-CoM, 2004) providing for the tasks of the 
two bodies in relation to the strategic goal for Bulgaria to adopt the euro as quickly 
as possible after accession to the EU. Under the agreement both sides undertake 
specific obligations. 
 
The most important aspect of the adopted strategy in Bulgaria, from the point of 
view of the analysis of the costs and benefits of euro area membership for the 
country, is the decision to preserve the currency board regime with the present rate 
of fixing to the euro, until the moment of actual changeover to the euro. To achieve 
this it is necessary to take a unilateral commitment to this rate during the 
negotiations for entering the ERM II. Given the fact that any alternative strategy 
would involve a double regime shift – going out of the currency board into some 
other monetary regime, and then transiting from that regime into the euro area – in 
a relatively short time horizon, following the single regime shift is justified. 
 
A second important element of the agreed strategy is the commitment by the 
government to maintain a balanced budget on a consolidated basis. Such a policy 
allows for the accumulation of fiscal reserves which can be used as a buffer against 
negative shocks. As discussed above in part 4 above, having a budget balance or 
surplus has been a feature of the Bulgarian economy. It is unclear to what extent 
the accumulated fiscal reserve of Bulgaria plays the role of a buffer to external 
shock. Since the beginning of the present crisis it has become obvious that if 
capital flows reverse, the fiscal reserve will not be able to substitute for them. 
However, the existence of the reserve itself has been a signal to economic agents 
which has helped to preserve to some degree their confidence in the economic 
environment in Bulgaria, helping prevent a sharp capital flow reversal. The 
effectiveness of this element of the strategy remains to be tested in the future. 
 
The other commitments by the government and the central bank with respect to 
euro adoption relate to the fulfillment of the inflation criterion, which is considered 
as the only problematic one for Bulgaria, and the legislative changes necessary to 
achieve full compliance with the monetary policy and banking acquis 
communautaire.
The strategic agreement between the Bulgarian government and the National bank 
does not address the issues of economic reforms necessary for the country to avoid 
the major risk related to the integration of a large economic space. As discussed in 
parts 3 and 5.1, a small country with asymmetric structure and different business 
cycle will face the risks of having to adjust to negative external shocks in an 
environment where monetary policy is not tailored to its specific needs. While this 
risk is not an issue in Bulgaria’s decision whether to join the euro, because under 
the currency board the risk is the same, it is still important for the long term 
development of the country. 
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Whether a country suffers negative consequences due to asymmetric shocks within 
a monetary union ultimately depends on the flexibility and adjustment capacity of 
its different markets. And this, in turn, depends on the policies pursued. Thus a 
major portion, if not all, of the potential for a small country in a large monetary 
union is conditional on government policies to be pursued in the future. These 
policies relate to the flexibility of labor and goods markets, to the smoothness of 
entry and exit procedures for firms, to the degree of competition in the domestic 
markets. The formulation of such policies is a crucial element in the ability of the 
Bulgarian economy to reap the full benefits from euro area membership while 
keeping the potential costs to a minimum. The Bulgarian government strategy with 
respect to the euro adoption, however, is silent on these policies. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This study has focused on the case of Bulgaria in an attempt to evaluate the 
potential costs and benefits of joining the euro area for the country. It has stepped 
on the existing literature, especially devoted to other new EU member states, to 
identify several groups of potential costs and benefits, and has applied them to the 
specific Bulgarian context to arrive at a general estimate. 
 
The main conclusion is that the expected overall effect is strongly positive, 
especially for the case of Bulgaria. While it will benefit significantly through higher 
growth as a result of increased trade and capital flows, the country will not suffer 
from the most widely discussed risk – the disappearance of the ability to 
accommodate negative external shocks through domestic monetary policy – 
because it is already given up its domestic monetary policy through the currency 
board regime. 
 
However, the more in-depth analysis of the case of Bulgaria suggests a broader 
conclusion. The cost of euro adoption caused by the loss of independent monetary 
policy does not seem to be a relevant issue not only for Bulgaria or other currency 
board countries, but for all East European EU members. This is due to the fact that 
these countries have an extremely limited capacity of monetary policy to affect 
domestic monetary conditions. This situation is a result of a combination of factors. 
First, EU membership means that countries are not isolated from pan-European 
goods, but more importantly capital and services (especially financial services) 
flows. Second, a very large proportion of the banking sectors in these countries is 
owned by other EU organizations, most often EU banks, which have access to 
financing in euro and can operate in euro. Third, the East European EU member 
states are very small compared to the euro area and to euro area banks, meaning 
that the flows originating from the euro area and its banks are large relative to the 
abilities of local monetary authorities to balance them. Fourth, competition among 
banks for market share, combined with their access to outside financing in euro, 
means local monetary policy instruments have a very limited capacity to influence 
their decisions. 
 
East European EU member states are severely limited in their capacity to mitigate 
external shocks through domestic monetary policy due to their very status as EU 
members. Thus preserving a nominal independence of monetary policy for them is 
not a very potent alternative to euro adoption. 
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